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Abstract 
This research explores the level of security awareness, of domestic Internet 
users in New Zealand. Awareness and online security are the top priorities of 
the New Zealand Cyber Security Strategy, but little research has been 
conducted to gauge the current level of security awareness in context with 
common mitigation strategies. The majority of the literature on the subject is 
primarily focused on organisational technology security and awareness so this 
had to be put in context with domestic users. 
 
A sample set of Facebook friends of the researcher were asked to respond to 
an online survey. The survey explored the respondents’ attitude and self-
evaluated level of security awareness, and their awareness of a subset of 
mitigation strategies from the Australian Defence Signals Directorates’ 
‘Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions’. 
 
The respondents demonstrated a good level of security awareness regarding 
patching and anti-virus, but there is a need for more education regarding access 
control and social engineering.  
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Introduction 
“Infamous hacker Mitnick says only users can stop security leaks.” 
(Wasserman, 2000) 
 
Much of the media and academic writing on computer security issues and 
their mitigation focuses on corporate environments. However, access to the 
Internet is now considered a basic human right by the United Nations 
(Anonymous, 2011, Pg 172), so do domestic users need to be aware of the 
same security issues and mitigation strategies? 
 
This research explores a number of corporate security issues and mitigation 
strategies and puts them into context with domestic users. But how 
widespread is the problem and is there any security issue where both 
domestic and corporate systems play a role and have a direct impact on each 
other? 
 
One example of a risk that affects both organisational and domestic, Internet 
connected systems is botnets. 
 
“Unprotected home computers that are infected with malware can be 
used as a resource to build botnets. Botnets harness the computing 
power of thousands or even millions of individual computers to launch 
remote attacks on information and communications networks, 
commercial systems and government websites with the aim of denying 
the legitimate use of the service.” (New Zealand Ministry of Economic 
Development (NZMED), 2011, Pg 4). 
 
Individual infected machines are referred to as Bots or Zombies. Command 
and Control servers or infrastructure are what hackers use to control the 
botnets and target the victim system/s (Cooke, Jahanian & McPherson, 2005, 
Pg 1). The New Zealand Cyber Security Strategy (NZCSS) defines malware 
as “Malicious software or potentially unwanted software installed without 
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informed user consent, generally covering a range of software programmes 
designed to attack, or prevent the intended use of information and 
communications networks.” (NZMED, 2011, Pg 13). 
 
 “According to a recent report, the number of new bots observed each 
day rose from less than 2,000 to more than 30,000 over the first six 
months of 2004. The total number of bot infected systems has been 
measured to be between 800,000 to 900,000 and the Cyber 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) has described botnets with more 
than 100,000 members.” (Cooke et al, 2005, Pg 1). 
 
On March 31, 2010 the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency 
Response Team (ICS-CERT) released a security advisory for the Mariposa 
botnet. This advisory states that in December 2009 “authorities took down a 
12.7 million strong zombie network” (ICS-CERT, 2010, Pg 1). This advisory 
also states that “it is not uncommon for new groups to assume control of old 
or abandoned botnets by compromising existing command and control or by 
establishing new command and control infrastructure using slightly modified 
malware” (ICS-CERT, 2010, Pg 1). 
 
Mitigation and disruption of botnets is difficult due to the distributed nature of 
the zombie machines (Cooke et al, 2005, Pg 6) and that victims may not know 
their machine has been compromised (ICS-CERT, 2010, Pg 1). In order to 
defend against infection “There are a range of existing techniques, including 
anti-virus software (AV), firewalls, and automatic patching” (Cooke et al, 2005, 
Pg 1). This example shows that both organisations and domestic users of the 
Internet are vulnerable to security threats.  
 
The New Zealand Government also define the following cyber threats: 
• Cyber Crime – Organised crime, dealing in identity theft, selling fake 
goods, stolen credit card details etc. 
• Cyber espionage – attacks against government and critical 
infrastructure. 
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• Hacktivism - gaining control of computer systems or websites to 
promote a cause, make a political statement or disrupt services.  
• Terrorist use of the Internet – with a growing dependence on 
networked systems and the Internet, vulnerable systems may be 
targeted.  
(NZMED, 2011, Pg 5) 
 
More specifically for domestic users, the NZCSS also highlights social 
networking threats: 
• Cyber criminals are increasingly using social networking sites to lure 
victims to web sites that attempt to push malware or launch an attack 
on the victim’s computer. 
• Attackers exploit the profile information available on social networking 
sites (e.g. birth dates, phone numbers, employment details and other 
information) to mount targeted attacks. 
(NZMED, 2011, Pg 5) 
 
In 2011 The National Business Review (NBR) published an article regarding 
one of the more widely publicised threats of hacktivism in New Zealand. The 
hacker group Anonymous announced their intention to attack the New 
Zealand Department of Internal Affairs (NZDIA). The group disagreed with the 
implementation of an Internet filter that blocked access to images, videos or 
promotion of child sexual abuse claiming it was “Internet censorship” (NBR, 
2011). The group intended to attack and deny access to NZDIA’s website by 
utilising a botnet to launch a denial of service (DoS) attack (Computerworld 
Staff, 2011). A DoS flooding attack is “a network based attack in which agents 
intentionally saturate system resources with increased network traffic’ to deny 
access by legitimate users” (Carl, Kesidis, Brooks & Rai, 2006, Pg 82).  
 
This attack was targeted at a government agency rather than domestic users 
but shows that attacks are being targeted in New Zealand and how 
compromised domestic systems can be used.  
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A recent survey showed that 54% of New Zealanders feel they know little or 
nothing at all about computer security risks and solutions (NZMED, 2011, Pg 
4). With this little security knowledge, will the implementation of Ultra-Fast 
Broadband be a national asset or a high-speed platform populated with 
compromised domestic systems? 
 
The New Zealand government is focused on delivering high-speed Internet 
connectivity. 
 
“The vision of Crown Fibre Holdings (CFH) is to lead the rollout of 
Ultra-Fast Broadband to 75% of New Zealanders by 2019. CFH will 
lead the telecommunications industry in rolling out Ultra-Fast 
Broadband rapidly, efficiently and cost-effectively, and will enable and 
drive uptake of Ultra-Fast Broadband across New Zealand” (Crown 
Fibre Holdings, 2010). 
 
Internet based threats are targeting both organisational and domestic users. 
Both groups need to understand the relevant threats and mitigation strategies 
for their Internet connected systems. The government is building faster 
networks and recognises the need for greater security awareness by domestic 
users. 
 
This research will attempt to answer the question: 
 
What level of technology security awareness of mitigation strategies do 
domestic Internet users have to prevent targeted intrusions? 
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Literature Review 
The majority of academic and practitioner literature on technology security, 
awareness and mitigation strategies is based on government and business 
systems. As a result, the majority of examples in this research have an 
organisational focus but are then put in context with domestic Internet users. 
Organisational Security Risks 
The Department of Labours’ ‘Survey of Information Technology (IT) Recruiters 
2008’, “found that 36 out of the 50 IT occupations surveyed were difficult to 
fill” (Department of Labour, 2008 Pg 4). The survey found the following roles 
to be the most difficult to fill: 
• ICT security specialist (100% of recruiters had difficulty filling 
vacancies) 
• Telecommunications network planner (100%) 
• Telecommunications technical officer or technologist (93%)  
• ICT systems test engineer (93%)  
• ICT support and test engineer not elsewhere counted (85%)  
• Telecommunications network engineer (84%)  
• Telecommunications engineer (83%)  
• ICT quality assurance engineer (83%)  
• Software engineer (82%)  
• Software and applications programmers not elsewhere counted (81%)  
(Department of Labour, 2008, Pg 5) 
 
As has been demonstrated the ICT industry has an overall lack of security 
skills and knowledge, and the same is also true for domestic users. In order to 
understand what awareness is required we must first understand the threats 
organisations and domestic Internet users need to defend themselves from. 
 
Security breaches in large enterprises can impact their services and millions 
of domestic users. In 2011 “Sony suffered a massive breach in its video game 
online network that led to the theft of names, addresses and possibly credit 
 10 
card data belonging to 77 million user accounts in what is one of the largest-
ever Internet security break-ins” (Reuters, 2011).   
 
On 17th January 2007, TJX Companies Incorporated (TJX) announced what 
has been characterized as the largest retail security breach in history (Shaw, 
2010, Pg 546). The breach resulted in the loss of 94,000,000 credit cards 
data, and other personal information such as drivers license details, military 
and state identification numbers and names and addresses (Shaw, 2010, Pg 
546). As a credit card merchant, TJX are required to be compliant with the 
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). Investigations into 
the breach revealed that there were a number of contributing factors: 
• Storing and transmitting personal information in clear text (Not 
encrypted). 
• Failing to use readily available security measures to limit access to 
wireless networks and card authorization computers. 
• System administrators not being required to use strong passwords. 
• Insufficient measures to detect and prevent unauthorised access such 
as updating anti-virus software. 
• Not following up on security intrusion alerts. 
 
Although they had been assessed as compliant with the standard, many of 
the requirements weren’t in place. Additionally they were storing magnetic 
stripe data that is prohibited by the participating credit card brands. 
“The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) charged, TJX engaged in a 
number of practises that, taken together, failed to provide reasonable and 
appropriate security for personal information on its networks.” (Shaw, 2010, 
Pg 547). This shows that even large organisations that are required to comply 
with governance standards have difficulty securing their systems. 
 
Because New Zealand does not have appropriate security breach laws that 
require mandatory disclosure of the loss of sensitive information, it is difficult 
to find information on local data breaches. In New Zealand Legislation  
 
 11 
regarding mandatory disclosure of data breaches is under review as many go 
unreported (Scroggie, 2011). 
 
Although it is difficult to judge how many data breaches occur in New 
Zealand, the media has reported some examples. In 2010 the Auckland City 
Councils’ Downtown Car Park suffered a data breach that resulted in the loss 
of at least 100,000 of its customers credit card information (Vass, 2010). 
Queenstown’s Main Street parking building also suffered a similar breach in 
2010 (Bryant, 2010). Based on technology security incidents that were 
reported to the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) in 2010, nearly 25% of 
New Zealanders have been victims of cyber crime or cyber security incidents 
with an associated cost of approximately $600 million (NCSC, 2012).  
Organisational Security Risk Mitigation Strategies  
Due to security issues and a lack of security knowledge that have resulted in 
data breaches, governments and a number of market sectors have introduced 
security standards and governance frameworks. The NZCSS provides a high 
level strategy but does not go into detail regarding policy or mitigation 
strategies. The New Zealand Information Security Manual (NZISM) was 
published in 2010 and replaced the New Zealand Security of Information 
Technology (NZSIT) 400, 401 and 402 policies and guidelines which were 
published in 2008 (Government Communications Security Bureau, 2012). The 
NZISM is intended to be a formal guideline for government agencies. This 
document is publically available so it can be used as a guideline for 
government agencies, business and private sector organisations. It is a large 
complex document and would be difficult to apply to domestic users. 
 
In 2011 the Australian Department of Defence, Defence Signals Directorate 
(DSD) published ‘Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Intrusions’, which won the 
National Cyber Security Award in 2011. The award is judged on four main 
criteria: 
• It is an innovation that has not been deployed effectively before; 
• It can show a significant impact on reducing cyber risk; 
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• It can be scaled quickly to serve large numbers of people; and 
• It should be adopted quickly by many organisations. 
 The research done by the DSD found four controls that “must be 
implemented across all Cabinet-level organizations if they are to have any 
hope of defending their systems against targeted intrusions” (Paller, 2011). 
“At least 85% of the targeted cyber intrusions that the DSD responded to in 
2010 could have been prevented by following the first four mitigation 
strategies” (DSD, 2011, Pg 1). 
 
“The cost of implementing these four controls is a tiny fraction of the 
cost of implementing the average U.S. federal government agency 
cyber security program. Since the impact of this low-cost approach is 
much better security than what U.S. agencies are experiencing, the 
Australian innovation changes the game” (Paller, 2011).  
 
The strategy also has proven success. The DSD worked with government 
agencies to implement the top four strategies and as a result “the spread of 
targeted attacks is no longer a significant problem” (SANS, 2011). 
 
While the Strategy is targeted at government agencies, business and private 
sector organisations, three of the top four mitigation strategies can be 
implemented by domestic users at no cost. Also rather than being a large 
complex document, the DSD document is a brief, ranked set of mitigation 
strategies. The top four strategies are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – DSD Top Four Mitigation Strategies 
Ranking Strategy 
1. 
Patch applications e.g. PDF viewer, Flash Player, Microsoft Office and Java. Patch or mitigate 
within two days for high-risk vulnerabilities. Use the latest version of applications. 
2. 
Patch operating system vulnerabilities. Patch or mitigate within two days for high-risk 
vulnerabilities. Use the latest operating system version. 
3. 
Minimise the number of users with domain or local administrative privileges. Such users should 
use a separate unprivileged account for email and web browsing. 
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4. 
Application whitelisting to help prevent malicious software and other unapproved programs from 
running e.g. by using Microsoft Software Restriction Policies or AppLocker. 
 (DSD, 2011 Pg 2) 
 
The PCI DSS was created to provide a minimum standard of technology 
security for credit card merchants and service providers. The standard is 
created and maintained by the Payment Card Industry Security Standards 
Council (PCI SSC). Representatives from Visa, MasterCard, American 
Express, Discover and JCB formed the PCI SSC. The PCI DSS was 
introduced in 2004 to reduce the amount of credit card fraud that was being 
perpetrated. This standard is targeted at businesses; covers the three aspects 
of the Informal Formal Technical (IFT) model (Backhouse, Liebenau & Land, 
1990) and its 211 requirements include at least the top three mitigation 
strategies.  
 
Although government and industry standards may vary in their focus on what 
is to be protected and to what degree, they do have common requirements/ 
mitigation techniques. The security controls in these standards can be broken 
down into three types of controls; Informal, Formal and Technical controls. 
These three areas form the basis of the IFT security model, which shows that 
to achieve effective technology security the three components must be in 
balance and support each other (Backhouse, 1997, Pg 34). 
 
The informal element addresses the human aspect of security. Knowledge of 
an organisation’s technology is often widely spread through the organisation. 
In current distributed architectures, ensuring employees understanding and 
attitude towards their security responsibilities is critical to a well-rounded and 
balanced security posture (Backhouse, 1997, Pg 34). 
 
The formal element addresses the supporting security policies, procedures 
and processes of an organisation. The formal elements support both the 
technical and informal elements of the IFT model by providing formal 
foundations and boundaries for the informal and technical controls to operate 
in (Backhouse, 1997, Pg 34). 
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The technical element addresses the security technologies in place at an 
organisation. Security technologies such a firewalls, Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS)/ Intrusion Detection & Prevention Systems (IDP), access 
controls systems etc are examples of technical controls (Backhouse, 1997, Pg 
34). 
Patching and Anti-virus 
The complex nature of computer programs results in regular errors and 
vulnerabilities being found in the programming code. Some of the errors result 
in unusual behaviour or instability of systems. The vulnerabilities can cause 
security issues that can be exploited to gain unauthorised access to systems 
or privilege escalation, which allows a malicious user to take control of a 
system (Liu, Kuhn, Rossman, 2009, Pg 49). 
 
Software vendors such as Adobe, regularly publish bulletins advising users 
that updates to fix errors are available (Adobe, 2012). Microsoft also regularly 
releases updates to their operating systems. These updates are also referred 
to as patches. In 2002 Microsoft introduced the Trustworthy Computing 
Initiative to encourage the development of more secure code and more 
secure default security settings to help protect users (Microsoft, 2003).  
 
Organisational governance policies recognise the importance of regularly 
updating system. The PCI DSS, for example, has a requirement to keep all 
systems up to date and patched (PCI SSC, 2010, Pg 11). The top two 
mitigation strategies to mitigate targeted cyber intrusions are: 
1. Patch applications 
2. Patch operating system vulnerabilities 
(DSD, 2011, Pg 2) 
 
Patching home computer systems is highly recommended for domestic 
Internet users. The SANS ‘Home Users PC Security: Threats To Windows 
Users and Countermeasures To Defend Against These Threats’ whitepaper 
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states: “Patch your system with Latest patches… These patches are critical to 
defend against vulnerabilities in Windows” (SANS, 2001, Pg 8). 
 
Another recommended mitigation strategy is anti-virus (AV) software. AV 
software is a program that is installed on a computer to defend against 
malware. It detects, blocks and if possible removes the malware to stop it 
infecting a computer. The majority of current AV products are signature 
based. The AV software scans the computer it is installed on looking for 
signatures (patterns of code in the malware) that match those in its database 
or dictionary of known malware ‘signatures’ (Zeltser, 2011, Pg 1).  
 
One of the limitations of AV is that it can only detect known malware. As 
hackers are constantly developing new malware, AV signatures need to be 
regularly updated (or patched) to keep them current (Zeltser, 2011, Pg 1). 
 
Once again this mitigation strategy can be found in governance policies. One 
of the twelve sections of the PCI DSS is dedicated to the use of AV software 
and keeping its signatures up to date (PCI SSC, 2010, Pg 11). The use of AV 
is ranked 21 in DSD’s mitigation strategy (DSD, 2011, Pg 2).  As can be seen 
from the practitioner literature substantial focus is put on AV and keeping it up 
to date. SANS recommend domestic use of AV in the SANS ‘Home Users PC 
Security: Threats To Windows Users and Countermeasures To Defend 
Against These Threats’ whitepaper (SANS, 2001, Pg 8). 
Access Control 
Access control systems and policies control and maintain user accounts on 
computer systems. These controls include who can access a computer, what 
they can access on the computer and what actions they can perform. Access 
control is considered a critical security measure in organisations (Hu, 
Ferraiolo, Kuhn, 2006, Pg 3-5). There is an abundance of academic and 
practitioner literature on access control systems and models.  
 
The importance of access control can be seen by the emphasis put on it in 
practitioner literature. The PCI DSS again dedicates one of its 12 sections 
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to the topic and other access control requirements can be found as sub-
requirements in other sections (PCI SSC, 2010, Pg 15 & 17). The NZIMS 
states: 
“Inappropriate use of any feature or facility of a system that enables a 
privileged user to override system or application controls can be a 
major contributory factor to failures or cyber security incidents on 
systems” (GCSB, 2010, Pg 92).  
 
Minimising the use of administrator accounts is ranked 3rd in their Strategies 
to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions (DSD, 2011, Pg 2). On windows 
systems there are three main types of user accounts, Standard, Administrator 
and Guest. Standard users cannot make any changes that affect other users, 
install software etc. while Administrator accounts have full access to the 
system, system functions and the ability to manage user accounts (Microsoft, 
2012). The same user levels are also on Mac OS-X (Apple, 2012). 
Administrator user accounts are also referred to as privileged accounts (Hu et 
al, 2006, Pg 3). 
 
Access control is relevant to domestic users as it controls the ability to install 
software and perform administrative functions. Malware can often require the 
use of a privileged account to cause harm. If a user is not using this type of 
user-account for everyday tasks it can make it more difficult for malware to 
spread and resist efforts to remove it (DSD, June 2011, Pg 1) 
 
Password security is a subset of access control. Enforcement of a strong 
password policy is ranked 18 by the DSD mitigation strategy. It goes on to say 
that the policy should cover complexity, length, dictionary words and reuse of 
the passphrase (DSD, 2011, Pg 2).  
 
The PCI DSS goes into greater detail. The standards definition of a strong 
password can be found in requirements 8.5.9 to 8.5.13. Compliance with the 
standard requires: 
• Regular password changes (at least every 90 days) 
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• Minimum password length of seven characters 
• Passwords must contain both alpha and numeric characters 
• Users must not reuse any of the last four passwords used 
As the PCI DSS is a business focused standard in addition to the password 
composition requirements the PCI DSS also has requirements regarding the 
management of passwords and formal password controls in the form of 
documented policies (PCI SSC, 2010, Pg 17). 
 
The NZISM states ‘A simple six-letter password can be brute-forced in 
minutes by software available on the Web. Passwords with at least seven 
characters utilising upper and lower case, numbers and special characters 
have a much greater resistance to brute force attacks’ (Government 
Communications Security Bureau, 2010, Pg 190). The remainder of password 
related guidance is similar to the PCI DSS in that it focuses on password 
management and associated formal controls. 
 
Fordham and, Zviran & Haga go into greater detail on the construct of a 
strong password and appropriate associated behaviours to protect individuals’ 
passwords. These articles extend alphanumeric passwords to include the use 
of special characters and that the length of the password is also a key 
consideration. It also introduces the concept of a passphrase rather than a 
password, obfuscation, randomness and password/ phrase creation and recall 
techniques. (Fordham, 2008; Zviran & Haga, 1999) 
 
The more random and longer a password the better it is. However, this may 
make a password the more difficult to remember. A passphrase is a 
combination of words to make a long password easier to remember. 
Alternatively the first letter from each word of a sentence can be use. 
Obfuscation is when letters are replaced with numbers or special characters 
eg #, %, ^. The use of capital and lower case letters is also recommended 
(Fordham, 2008, Pg 44 & 47). 
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Social Engineering  
Social engineering is described as “…the art and science of getting people to 
comply with your wishes…” It has also been referred to as ‘the art of 
deception’ (Kamal & Crews, 2008, Pg 145). 
 
On June 16, 2011 a Microsoft press release stated, ‘Microsoft Survey Reveals 
Extent of Emerging Internet Phone Scam’ which detailed a social engineering 
scam. The press release also stated that the criminals were targeting English-
language markets, it was expected to go global and costs victims on average 
US$875 (Microsoft, 2011). On November 4, 2010, 5:14 pm the New Zealand 
police released a warning about the same scam being perpetrated in New 
Zealand. The scam involved the victim receiving a call from someone 
allegedly from Microsoft support. They victim would be told that they 
(Microsoft) had detected a virus or malicious software on the victims 
computer. In one case reported in Palmerston North the perpetrator asked the 
victim to run a command that returns a standard response on all Microsoft 
operating systems. This technique is commonly used to win the victims trust. 
The perpetrator then leads the victim to either a web site that gains remote 
access to the victims’ computer or they are asked to make a payment so the 
virus or malicious software can be removed (Ellingham, 2011). 
 
Mitigation of human based social engineering requires a different approach 
from traditional hacking protection and prevention. Technical controls cannot 
protect a user from this type of attack instead behavioural mitigation 
strategies, such as security awareness training, are required. This can be 
achieved through security awareness education (Kamal et al, 2008, Pg 149).  
 
Security Awareness Training 
The digital divide looks at ICT related access and knowledge gaps. These 
gaps include education and awareness gaps, between nations and their 
citizens. Education and awareness programs are also a fundamental 
component of Information Technology security frameworks and models. The 
IFT model shows that effective security can be achieved when informal 
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controls, which look at the human element, security awareness and 
behaviours, are in balance with formal controls (policies and procedures) and 
technical controls (Backhouse, 1997, Pg 34). 
 
Other models such as the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 
1989) show us that the successful adoption of technologies and related 
governance frameworks require top down support from senior management 
and an organisational wide awareness of why the technology or controls are 
required (Del Aguila-Obra & Padilla-Melendez, 2006, Pg 106). When this is 
put in context with the security and social engineering issues, as described in 
the previous sections, it shows the need for this balance domestically as well 
as in business environments 
 
In the case of domestic users this top down support could be seen as coming 
from the government. The government have ‘lead by example’ by forming the 
Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) and National Cyber 
Security Centre (NCSC). While GCSB are focused on the protection of 
government agencies NCSC work with industry and critical infrastructure 
providers (Telecommunications companies, banks, energy companies etc) to 
work with these organisations and provide guidance to help them adequately 
protect their systems from malicious attacks. Similar agencies exist in other 
countries i.e. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Australian Defence 
Signals Directorate. 
 
In addition to providing the leadership from the top these agencies also help 
provide guidance regarding Formal and Technical security controls as 
described by the IFT model. This is done by the open publication of 
government security policies and guidelines. As well as providing templates 
for formal controls these documents also discuss specific cyber attacks and 
the technical mitigation techniques to defend against them. 
 
Recognition of the need for appropriate security awareness training 
addresses the need to balance the Formal and Technical controls with 
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appropriate Informal controls. Informal controls are included in security and 
governance standards like the PCI DSS but the requirements for them may 
only be a small percentage of the overall requirements. For example security 
awareness requirements only contribute 1.5% to overall compliance with the 
PCI DSS (PCI SSC 2010).  
 
Security awareness training can be one of the most effective security controls 
an organisation can implement (Hagen, Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2008). The 
contribution these programs can make to the overall security profile of an 
organisation is far greater than the emphasis security standards like the PCI 
DSS put on them. How much focus, if any, is put on the security awareness of 
domestic users and where is the focus coming from? Although government 
publications and standards like the PCI DSS only have small sections of their 
overall framework dedicated to security awareness programs, the NZCSS put 
awareness and online security, as its top priority. 
 
Priority 1 of the NZCSS is ‘Increasing Awareness and Online Security ‘. This 
priority states that it will partner with industry and non-government 
organisations to raise awareness with a long-term goal of working with 
Internet Service Providers (ISP) to develop appropriate solutions. However, 
how ISP’s are expected to address this is not clear.  
 
The NZCSS is the New Zealand’s overarching cyber security strategy and is 
intended to influence government, industry, non-government organisations 
and academia. Government have recognised that that improving cyber 
security is a shared responsibility. This is why priority 1 of the strategy targets 
these areas in the short and long term. Although the need to raise security 
awareness of domestic users is identified in the strategy it would appear that 
the government do not intend to address this directly but rather though their 
partnerships with government agencies, non-government organisations, 
industry and academia. 
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Domestic Users 
 
The digital divide refers to knowledge of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) and the level of Internet access of a country’s citizens.  
Local research into the digital divide supports the existence of a knowledge 
and access gap in New Zealand and explores the four key barriers to the use 
of the Internet: 
1) Physical access to ICTs 
2) ICT skills and support 
3) Attitudes 
4) Content 
(Cullen, 2003, Pg 249).  
 
The issue of physical access appears to becoming less of an issue at the time 
this research was conducted. In 2001 only 37% of New Zealand homes had 
access to the Internet (as cited in Statistics New Zealand, 2004, Pg 7), while 
in 2009, 75% of New Zealand homes had access to the Internet (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2010 Pg 2). As can be seen by the CFH vision, ongoing focus 
has been put on this issue. 
 
Statistics New Zealand also states that technology literacy and skills are 
influencing factors on use of the Internet and are considered key to job 
prospects (Statistics New Zealand, 2004, Pg 5). While these reports do not 
contribute to helping understand the nature of the knowledge gap, as this area 
was not included in their research, it does show the scale of domestic Internet 
access in New Zealand. 
 
People in professional occupations can acquire ICT skills as part of their role 
but this is less likely for manual workers, the unemployed and people that do 
not have any form of tertiary education (Cullen, 2003, Pg 250). However, as 
has been demonstrated, the ICT industry has a substantial lack of skilled 
resources.  
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People’s attitudes can also impact their use of the Internet (Cullen, 2003, Pg 
250) and successful adoption of ICT’s (Del Aguila-Obra et al, 2006, Pg 106). 
The attitudinal barrier includes people’s reluctance to develop ICT knowledge 
and skills, and “concern over the lack of security of personal information on 
computers and the internet” (Cullen, 2003, Pg 250).  
 
"Companies spend millions of dollars on firewalls and secure access 
devices, and it's money wasted because none of these measures 
address the weakest link in the security chain: the people who use, 
administer and operate computer systems," (as cited in Wasserman, 
2000). 
 
While the breaches that have been discussed were all perpetrated on 
business or government systems the same issues are relevant to the home 
user. The ‘Computer security risks to home users’ section of the Home 
Network Security document published by the Cyber Emergency Response 
Team (CERT) Coordination Centre confirm that these issues also relate to 
home networks (CERT, 2006)  
 
Traditionally home users would access the Internet from personal computers 
and laptops. Smart devices including phones, television sets, IP based video 
telephony and gaming consoles such as the Microsoft x-box 360 also use 
home networks and are able to provide internet access.  
 
In 2007, at the New Zealand hacker conference Kiwicon, two presenters using 
the hacker handles Oddy (Beau Butler) and Eon gave a presentation titled 
‘Straight To Video: Bugging the Boardroom’. During this talk they 
demonstrated how to exploit vulnerabilities in video conferencing software and 
hardware that allowed the hacker to remotely activate the system and take 
control of it. Although he had not researched these technologies, Beau Butler 
confirmed that it is likely a motivated hacker would be able to exploit 
vulnerability in these systems and activate the video and voice capabilities 
remotely. He referenced the Sony hack as an example of a targeted attack on 
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a vendor that produces these types of technologies. He went on to say that 
technologies like the x-box 360 if compromised en masse could be used to 
attack Microsoft using legitimate connections (Butler, Beau personal 
communication, January 18, 2012). 
 
The Securityfocus.com BugTraq online security vulnerability advisory service 
published ‘a privilege escalation vulnerability’ (This type of vulnerability takes 
advantage of programming errors or design flaws to grant the attacker 
elevated access to the network, it’s associated data or applications 
(TechTarget, 2010)) for the X-box 360 in 2007. The vulnerability allowed the 
hacker to take control of the system and execute arbitrary code that could 
include malware (Anonymous Hacker, 2007). This highlights the need for 
security awareness by home Internet users beyond traditional access 
methods. 
 
These examples show that not only are domestic internet users impacted by 
targeted breaches of corporate systems but that domestic users themselves 
are also a target. 
 
Although the mitigation strategies that have been explored have been 
targeted at organisations, they have been put in context with domestic 
Internet users, who at no cost could implement the top three strategies from 
DSD.  
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Research method 
Technology security is a broad, highly complex, and technical topic. With a 
population that has a highly varied level of Internet access and technology 
related skills, this diversity further complicates the ability to ascertain the level 
of technology security awareness. For the purpose of this research the 
sample population were people who had Internet access. According to 
Statistics New Zealand’s survey in 2009 that was 75% of the population 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2010, Pg 2). 
 
The sample selection for the research was friends of the researcher on 
Facebook. At the time the research was conducted the researcher had 305 
Facebook friends. The response rate from the population was 32%, 107 
respondents. Respondents who were not from or living in New Zealand were 
excluded as were any incomplete responses leaving a total population of 98 
respondents in the sample set. The sample set could then be split into people 
who worked in IT and those who did not for comparative purposes. This was 
based on the assumption that people that work in IT are more likely to have a 
higher level of technical understanding. 
 
Quantitative research was selected, as the data to be collected was to be 
objective and measurable rather than subjective (Lee, 1992, Pg 87). 
Anonymous Online Survey 
The data gathering method for the research was an anonymous online 
survey. The survey ran from 19th December 2011 to 9th January 2012. The 
survey consisted of 18 Questions.  
 
The first two questions established the demographic of the respondent and if 
they worked in IT. The next two questions were used to ascertain how 
important the respondents thought technology security awareness was for 
New Zealand and what they believed their own level of awareness was.  
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Questions five to eleven were based on the DSD “Strategies to Mitigate Cyber 
Intrusions” document. In each case these strategies can be achieved at no 
cost for a domestic user and can reduce the likelihood of them becoming the 
victim of a cyber attack by approximately 70%. Table 1 shows how the 
questions were aligned with the strategies and the ranking of the strategy. In 
some cases questions may be related to more than one strategy and vice 
versa.  
 
The Top 35 Mitigation Strategies are ranked in order of overall effectiveness. 
Rankings are based on DSD’s analysis of reported security incidents and 
vulnerabilities detected by DSD in testing the security of Australian 
Government networks (DSD, 2011). 
 
Table 1 – Survey questions 5 to 11 relationship to mitigation strategies. 
Strategy Ranking Related Survey Question 
Question 5: Which operating system 
does your computer use? (If you have 
more than one computer select as many 
as appropriate) 
Patch operating system vulnerabilities. 
Patch or mitigate within two days for high-
risk vulnerabilities. Use the latest 
operating system version. 2 
Question 6:  Does your computer 
automatically update the operating 
system (also known as patching)? 
Patch applications e.g. PDF viewer, Flash 
Player, Microsoft Office and Java. Patch 
or mitigate within two days for high-risk 
vulnerabilities. Use the latest version of 
applications. 
1 
Question 7: Do your installed 
applications, for example, Microsoft 
Office, Adobe Reader/ Acrobat/ Flash, 
Firefox etc,  get updated automatically 
(also known as patching)? 
Question 8: Do you control access to 
your computer? E.g. have different 
users set up on your computer and / or 
require passwords? 
Minimise the number of users with domain 
or local administrative privileges. Such 
users should use a separate unprivileged 
account for email and web browsing. 
3 
Question 9: If you have different user 
logons configured on your computer 
what privileges/ rights/ user levels do the 
user logons on your computer have? 
Question 15: Which of the following 
options describe social engineering? 
(Select all that are correct) 
User education e.g. Internet threats and 
spear phishing socially engineered 
emails. Avoid: weak passphrases, 
passphrase reuse, exposing email 
addresses, and unapproved USB devices. 8 Question 18: Which of the following options would be the best way to 
provide security awareness training to 
you? (Please select as many options 
that you think are relevant) 
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Strategy Ranking Related Survey Question 
Question 8: Do you control access to 
your computer? E.g. have different 
users set up on your computer and / or 
require passwords? 
Enforce a strong passphrase policy 
covering complexity, length, and avoiding 
both passphrase reuse and the use of 
dictionary words. 
18 Question 10: Please describe and give 
an example of a strong password. 
(Please, in your example, do not 
describe any passwords you actually 
use) 
Anti-virus software with up to date 
signatures, reputation ratings and other 
heuristic detection capabilities. Use 
gateway and desktop anti-virus software 
from different vendors. 
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Question 11: From the following options 
please select all the options that best 
describe your understanding of anti-
virus software: 
 
Questions twelve to fifteen relate to social engineering and a scam that was 
current at the time the research was being conducted. The questions were 
included to discover how the respondents would respond to a current social 
engineering scam where the victim receives a call from someone 
impersonating Microsoft support and is specifically targeted at domestic users 
of the Internet. 
 
The final three questions established who the respondents’ thought was 
responsible for security awareness education, if they would make changes to 
reduce their chances of being hacked and what type of security awareness 
training they would prefer. 
 
A full list of the questions can be found in Appendix A. 
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Findings 
Demographics 
The first two questions of the survey split the respondents into the following 
demographic.  
Table 2 – Respondent Demographics 
Survey Question Response Type No. of responses 
Yes 98 
1. Are you living in or from 
New Zealand  
 
No 9 
Yes 28 
2. Do you work in the 
information technology 
industry? 
No 78 
 
Only 98 of the respondents from New Zealand were used for this research. 24 
of those respondents worked in the information technology industry and 74 
did not. For the purpose of this research the respondents were split into these 
groups for comparative purposes. 
Security Awareness 
When the survey asked about the importance of technology security 
awareness for the New Zealand public only one respondent from the non-IT 
workers group did not think it was important. When asked to rate their own 
level of technology security awareness the IT workers response average was 
2.37% higher than that of the non-IT-workers.  
 
Even though 99% of the respondents said that technology security awareness 
was important to the New Zealand public 9% of the respondents would not 
follow four simple steps to secure their machines if they were told the 
likelihood of being hacked could be reduced by approx 70%. 
The results for questions 2, 4 & 16-18 are detailed in Table 3. 
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Table 3 – Security Awareness 
Survey Question Response Type Total 
Sample Set 
IT Workers Non-IT 
Workers 
Yes 99% 100% 99% 
3.  Do you think 
that technology 
security 
awareness by the 
New Zealand 
Public is 
important? 
No 1% 0% 1% 
Minimum 1 5 1 
Maximum 10 10 10 
4.  On a scale of 1- 
10 (1 being no 
awareness and 10 
being very aware) 
please rate your 
current level of 
technology 
security 
awareness 
Slider 
Average 5.92 7.71 5.34 
The 
Government 54% 77% 47% 
Internet Service 
Providers 90% 100% 86% 
Schools and 
educational 
institutes 
77% 82% 76% 
Technology 
retailers 75% 77% 74% 
16. Who do you 
think is 
responsible for 
teaching the public 
about technology 
security practices? 
(Please select as 
many options that 
you think are 
relevant) 
Multiple Answer 
I don’t think it’s 
important 0% 0% 0% 
Yes 91% 79% 95% 
17.  If you were 
told that there 
were four things, 
that didn't cost 
anything and could 
be done in less 
than ten simple 
steps, that would 
reduce the 
chances of you 
getting hacked by 
70% would you 
make those 
changes? 
No 9% 21% 5% 
Free on-line 
training course 69% 73% 66% 
18.  Which of the 
following options 
would be the best 
way to provide 
security 
awareness training 
to you? (Please 
select as many 
options that you 
think are relevant) 
Multiple Answers 
TV program / 
advertisements 54% 50% 55% 
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Survey Question Response Type Total 
Sample Set 
IT Workers Non-IT 
Workers 
Reminder e-m 
ails of security 
practices from 
your Internet 
service 
provider 
63% 50% 66% 
Posters 
describing 
good security 
practices 
25% 36% 22% 
  
Demonstrations 
of how security 
breaches can 
occur 
61% 73% 58% 
Patching and Anti-virus 
Non-IT workers had greater diversity in the operating systems used but also 
IT-workers tended to use more recent operating systems. Both groups were 
similar when it came to patching but IT workers had a consistently better 
understanding of anti-virus. The details for the questions regarding Patching 
and anti-virus can be found in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 – Patching & Anti-Virus 
Survey Question Response Type Total 
Sample 
Set 
IT Workers Non-IT 
Workers 
Windows 95 0% 0% 0% 
Windows ME 0% 0% 0% 
Windows 2000 3% 0% 4% 
Windows XP 39% 29% 43% 
Windows Vista 11% 17% 9% 
Windows 7 48% 67% 41% 
Mac OSX 
Leopard 2% 0% 3% 
Mac OSX Snow 
Leopard 11% 4% 13% 
Mac OSX Lion 7% 13% 4% 
Older Mac OS 1% 0% 1% 
5. Which 
operating system 
does your 
computer use? (If 
you have more 
than one 
computer select 
as many as 
appropriate) 
Multiple answer 
 
Linux Variant 4% 8% 3% 
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Survey Question Response Type Total 
Sample 
Set 
IT Workers Non-IT 
Workers 
  Other 7% 13% 4% 
No, but I apply 
updates 
manually 
24% 25% 24% 
Yes, updates 
are done 
automatically 
67% 71% 66% 
No, I don’t 
update my 
operating 
system 
3% 4% 3% 
6. Does your 
computer 
automatically 
update the 
operating system 
(also known as 
patching)? 
Single Answer 
I don’t know 
what this means 5% 0% 7% 
No, but I apply 
updates 
manually 
43% 46% 42% 
Yes, updates 
are done 
automatically 
52% 54% 51% 
No, I don’t 
update my 
applications 
3% 0% 4% 
7. Do your 
installed 
applications, for 
example, 
Microsoft Office, 
Adobe Reader/ 
Acrobat/ Flash, 
Firefox etc, get 
updated 
automatically 
(also known as 
 patching)? 
Single Answer 
I don’t know 
what this means 2% 0% 3% 
I don’t know why 
anti-virus 
software is 
important or 
what it’s for 
0% 0% 0% 
I have a good 
understanding 
of anti-virus 
software and 
what it’s for 
64% 79% 59% 
All electronic 
documents 
should be 
scanned by anti-
virus software 
66% 67% 66% 
11. From the 
following options 
please select all 
the options that 
best describe 
your 
understanding of 
anti-virus 
software: 
Multiple Answer 
 
All e-mails 
should be 
scanned by anti-
virus software 
75% 79% 74% 
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Survey Question Response Type Total 
Sample 
Set 
IT Workers Non-IT 
Workers 
All Internet 
traffic should be 
scanned by anti-
virus software 
68% 67% 68% 
As long as my 
documents 
aren’t from the 
Internet they 
don’t need to be 
virus scanned 
9% 13% 8% 
I use anti-virus 
software at 
home 
82% 83% 82% 
I make sure m y 
anti-virus 
software is up to 
date 
70% 79% 67% 
I don’t use anti-
virus software at 
home, that I’m 
aware of 
3% 0% 4% 
  
I don’t use anti-
virus software at 
work, that I’m 
aware of 
0% 0% 0% 
 
Access Control 
Table 5 shows the results of the questions relating to access control and 
passwords. Only 24% of respondents had appropriate access control with 
multiple users that required passwords. 
 
Table 5 – Access control and passwords 
Survey Question Response Type Total 
Sample 
Set 
IT Workers Non-IT 
Workers 
8.  Do you control 
access to your 
computer? E.g. 
have different 
users set up on 
your computer 
and / or require 
passwords? 
Single Answer 
 
I don’t have 
different users 
set up on my 
computer, but a 
password is 
required 
49% 33% 54% 
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Survey Question Response Type Total 
Sample 
Set 
IT Workers Non-IT 
Workers 
I don’t have 
different users 
set up on my 
computer, and 
no password is 
required 
18% 8% 22% 
I have multiple 
users on m y 
computer, but 
they don’t 
require 
passwords 
6% 4% 7% 
I have multiple 
users on my 
computer, and 
they all require 
individual 
passwords 
27% 54% 18% 
  
I don’t know 0% 0% 0% 
All users have 
administrator 
rights 
33% 5% 44% 
I restrict what 
individual users 
can do on my 
computer 
60% 90% 49% 
9.  If you have 
different user 
logons configured 
on your computer 
what privileges/ 
rights/ user levels 
do the user 
logons your 
computer have? 
Single Answer 
 
I don’t know 
what this means 
7% 1% 7% 
 
 
Question 8 asked users to describe and provide an example of a strong 
password. The responses have been correlated and the percentage of 
responses that mentioned each of the following components has been 
detailed in Table 6: 
• Passphrase or obfuscation 
• Random 
• Mixed Case 
• Alphanumeric 
• Includes special characters 
• Length greater than eight characters 
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Table 6 – Strong Password Components by Percentage 
Strong password components by percentage 
All respondents 
 
Phrase or 
obfuscation 
Random Mixed Case Alphanumeric 
Special 
Characters 
Length 
Number 58 17 70 88 32 61 
Percentage 59% 17% 71% 89% 33% 62% 
IT Workers 
 
Phrase or 
obfuscation 
Random Mixed Case Alphanumeric 
Special 
Characters 
Length 
Number 21 4 21 22 17 21 
Percentage 88% 17% 88% 92% 71% 88% 
Non-IT Workers 
 
Phrase or 
obfuscation 
Random Mixed Case Alphanumeric 
Special 
Characters 
Length 
Number 37 13 49 66 15 40 
Percentage 50% 18% 66% 89% 20% 54% 
 
Social Engineering 
None of the respondents believed that Apple or MS would phone them 
regarding an issue; even so 3% of respondents would pay them money if the 
caller asked for it to fix an issue. Table 7 describes the responses to 
questions relating to social engineering. 
 
 
Table 7 - Social Engineering 
Survey Question Response Type Total 
Sample 
Set 
IT Workers Non-IT 
Workers 
Yes 0% 0% 0% 
12. Do you think 
that Microsoft or 
Apple would 
telephone to 
advise you that 
they have 
detected an issue 
or virus on your 
computer? 
No 100% 100% 100% 
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Survey Question Response Type Total 
Sample 
Set 
IT Workers Non-IT 
Workers 
Yes 1% 0% 1% 
Yes, but only if I 
understood what 
they were asking 
me to do 
5% 4% 5% 
13. If you received 
a call from 
someone saying 
they were from 
Microsoft or Apple 
and that a 
problem or virus 
was detected on 
your computer 
would you follow 
the steps they ask 
you to? 
Single Answer 
 
No 94% 96% 94% 
Yes 2% 0% 3% 
14. If you did 
follow the steps 
the person from 
Microsoft or Apple 
gave you, and 
then they asked 
you for money to 
fix the problem, 
would you pay 
them (please 
assume that you 
have the money to 
spare)? 
No 98% 100% 97% 
Shoulder surfing 
(watching what 
someone is 
typing) 
26% 29% 25% 
A type of web 
site design e.g. 
Facebook 
43% 24% 49% 
Shadowing, 
following 
someone 
through a 
security door 
26% 33% 24% 
A way of testing 
web site security 17% 14% 18% 
A way of 
teaching good 
security 
practices 
18% 19% 18% 
15.  Which of the 
following options 
describe social 
engineering? 
(Select all that are 
correct) 
Multiple Answer 
A type of 
hacking 44% 57% 40% 
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Discussion 
Kevin Mitnick, a famous hacker, asserts that users are the biggest risk to 
computer systems (as cited by Wasserman, 2000). 
 
As has been formally presented, technology security and awareness is a 
highly complex and technical issue. Although the majority of academic and 
practitioner literature is focused on organisations and their users, many of the 
threats and mitigation strategies for organisations are also relevant for 
domestic users.  
 
Attitude and concerns about security and privacy were highlighted as a barrier 
for use of the Internet (Cullen, 2003, Pg 250). It would appear that it is also of 
concern to the respondents of the survey, all of which are Internet users. Only 
one of them did not think that technology security and awareness was 
important to the New Zealand public. This shows the perceived importance of 
security for domestic users.  
 
This perception suggests that there would be a positive attitude towards the 
adoption of security technologies and practises.  When asked if the 
respondents would adopt 4 things that, at no cost, could reduce the likelihood 
of being hacked 91% of the total sample set said they would. The most 
surprising result was that 21% of IT-workers would not. No research was 
conducted to find out why this was the case. 
 
The self-rating of the respondents own level of security awareness were 
widespread with the overall average response being 5.92 out of 10 (where 10 
is very aware). As expected the IT workers rated themselves higher here with 
the lowest response being 5 compared to 1 from the non-IT workers. This 
may indicate that IT–workers reluctance to adopt suggested preventative 
measures might be because they believe they know better. However, it does 
confirm that people in professional occupations acquire IT skills as part of 
their job (Cullen, 2003, Pg 250). 
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Only 3 % of the respondents used windows 2000 which is not longer 
supported by Microsoft. As such no patches to fix newly discovered security 
vulnerabilities in the software are officially created (Microsoft, January, 2012). 
The same respondents were also the only ones that did not update their 
operating system. However, 5% of the respondents did not know what 
patching was. None of the IT workers used unsupported operating system 
software.  
 
Patching was well understood. Only 5% of respondents that had 
supported operating systems did not know what patching was. 
 
This is a positive result as the number of unsupported operating systems is 
low and the majority of supported operating systems are patched. 
 
The survey results regarding access control were much more concerning. By 
default computer users are privileged administration users. Only 33% of 
respondents had multiple users on their computers. Without having multiple 
users set up on computers it is not possible to have users without 
administrative privileges.  
 
Awareness of access controls was concerning. 56% of respondents 
relied on passwords alone for access control. 24% did not require 
passwords and only 19% of the respondents had unprivileged, non-
administrative users on their computers that required passwords. 
 
As the access control results that have been discussed so far demonstrate 
56% of the respondents are reliant on passwords alone so the strength of 
passwords is crucial. IT workers awareness of what makes a strong password 
was significantly higher in all areas apart from the use of random passwords 
where non-IT workers were ahead by 1%. 
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Using alphanumeric (a combination of both letters and numbers) was the 
most commonly strong password component, followed by the use of mixed 
case characters with a response of 71% overall. 54% of non-IT workers 
responded with or gave examples of passwords eight characters or longer. 
50% of non-IT workers understood or provided examples of passphrases or 
obfuscation and only 20% were aware of or provided examples using special 
characters. 
Awareness of strong passwords was also concerning. Only 2 out of 6 
strong password techniques were well understood by the respondents. 
The four techniques that were the least understood were the 
components that contribute the most towards strong passwords.  
 
82% of respondents used anti-virus software, there was little variation 
between the results from IT workers and non-IT workers. 
 
Anti-virus software was the most well understood mitigation strategy. 
Only 3% of respondents did not use anti-virus software that they knew 
of at home. 
 
The respondents’ interpretation of social engineering was almost evenly split 
with 44% responding that it was a type of hacking. Although none of the 
respondents thought Microsoft or Apple would ring to advise them of an issue 
or virus, 5% would follow instructions the caller gave them and 2% would give 
them money. As technical security controls cannot address this type of 
behavioural-based social engineering scam a different approach is required. 
This scam has been acknowledged by Microsoft (Microsoft, 2011). It would 
therefore seem reasonable that since they invest in producing patches to 
address security issues in their software, that Microsoft should invest in 
protecting their brand and launch a campaign to educate users about this 
scam. 
 
The government have recognised the need to increase awareness and online 
security for domestic Internet users. They intend to oversee this need by 
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working with government agencies, non-government organisations, industry 
and academia, rather than addressing it directly with the users. Only 54% of 
the respondents believed that the government was responsible for awareness 
education while approximately ¾ of the respondents felt it was academia and 
technology retailers’ responsibility. 90% of the respondents believed ISP’s 
were responsible for security awareness training. These responses support 
the government’s strategy. 
 
The respondents believed that an online security awareness program would 
be the most effective method of delivering security awareness training. 
Security awareness reminder e-mails from ISP’s were also thought to be an 
effective media. Awareness and understanding of breaches was also a 
popular response at 61% and was felt to be more effective than television 
advertisements on the subject (54%). This suggests that if New Zealand 
introduced mandatory breach disclosure laws this may have the unexpected 
benefit of increasing domestic users security awareness.  
 
Bruce Schneier, a highly regarded security practitioner states:  
“The real problem with computers is that they don’t work well. The 
industry wants to have it both ways. They’ve convinced everyone that 
people need a computer to survive, and at the same time they’ve made 
computers so complicated that only an expert can maintain them. 
Corporate users get by because there’s an IT department a phone call 
away; home users rely on the charity of their more sysadmin-inclined 
friends or suffer in silence.” (Schneier, 2006) 
 
Microsoft introduced the trustworthy computing initiative in 2002 to develop 
more secure computing platforms (Microsoft, 2003). Since the 
commencement of this research Apple have announced the inclusion of 
application white listing functionality in their OS-X operating system (Apple, 
2012). Application white listing helps prevent malicious software from running 
and is ranked 4 by DSD (DSD, 2011, Pg 2). This demonstrates both Apple  
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and Microsoft’s commitment to creating a more secure computing 
environment. 
 
What level of technology security awareness of mitigation strategies do 
domestic Internet users have to prevent targeted intrusions? 
 
In response to the research question, the level of awareness of mitigation 
strategies was good for patching and anti-virus; the majority of the 
respondents understood both mitigation strategies well. Social engineering 
was not a well-understood threat, 43% of the respondents thought it was a 
type of web site like Facebook rather than a hacking technique. Access 
control was the least understood mitigation strategy and is the area of 
greatest concern. 
Limitations 
The main limitation of this research was the size and demographic of the 
sample set. Only friends of the researcher were used in the sample set. As 
the researcher is a technology security practitioner, it is likely that a lot of the 
IT worker respondents were also technology security practitioners. 
Additionally the researcher has published security tips on Facebook that may 
have influenced their Facebook friends’ security awareness. 
 
This research only looked at the awareness level regarding password strength 
but did not differentiate between the respondents’ awareness and actual 
practises. In their response, one of the respondents who appeared to have a 
thorough understanding of strong passwords commented that they did not 
actually use strong passwords in practise. 
 
Although the media to deliver security awareness training was explored the 
most effective types of content were not. 
Further Research 
The research should be expanded to include a larger sample set of domestic 
Internet users, and include users who are not known to the researcher. 
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Only a small subset of technology security techniques were investigated, this 
should also be also be expanded to include web surfing and e-mail 
behaviours. 
 
It is possible that different computing environments i.e. Microsoft and Apple, 
may have differing levels of security by default. This should be explored to 
see if this influences the security of domestic users. Also different types of 
devices such as mobile devices, gaming consoles and smart devices should 
be researched to better establish the security level of the domestic users. 
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Conclusions 
Technology security and awareness is an issue and more focus is required to 
educate domestic Internet users in New Zealand. Although there is a good 
level of awareness regarding patching and anti-virus there is a need for 
further education about access control, strong passwords and social 
engineering as it relates to domestic users.  
 
The government’s approach increases awareness and online security, as 
described in the NZCSS, by working with stakeholders across government, 
industry (such as ISP’s), non-government and academia (NZMED, 2011, Pg 
6). This approach appears to be appropriate, as the survey results supported 
this.  
 
The NZCSS does not go into detail regarding the media it would use to 
increase awareness and online security. The survey respondents’ preferred 
methods were Internet based training and security awareness reminder e-
mails from ISPs. 
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Appendix A – Survey Questions 
1. Are you living in or from New Zealand?  
2. Do you work in the information technology industry? 
3. Do you think that technology security awareness by the New Zealand 
Public is important?  
4. On a scale of 1-10 (1 being no awareness and 10 being very aware) 
please rate your current level of technology security awareness  
5. Which operating system does your computer use? 
6. Does your computer automatically update the operating system(also 
known as patching)?  
7. Do your installed applications, for example, Microsoft Office, Adobe 
Reader/ Acrobat/Flash, Firefox etc, get updated automatically (also known 
as patching)?  
8. Do you control access to your computer? E.g. have different users set up 
on your computer and / or require passwords?  
9. If you have different user logons configured on your computer what 
privileges/ rights/ user levels do the user logons your computer have?  
10. Please describe and give an example of a strong password. 
11. From the following options please select all the options that best describe 
your understanding of anti-virus software:  
12. Do you think that Microsoft or Apple would telephone to advise you that 
they have detected an issue or virus on your computer?  
13. If you received a call from someone saying they were from Microsoft or 
Apple and that a problem or virus was detected on your computer would 
you follow the steps they ask you to?  
14. If you did follow the steps the person from Microsoft or Apple gave you 
and then they asked you for money to fix the problem, would you pay 
them (please assume that you have the money to spare)?  
15. Which of the following options describe social engineering? 
16. Who do you think is responsible for teaching the public about technology 
security practices?  
17. If you were told that there were four things, that didn't cost anything and 
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could be done in less than ten simple steps, that would reduce the 
chances of you getting hacked by 70% would you make those changes?  
18. Which of the following options would be the best way to provide security 
awareness training to you?  
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Appendix B – Acronyms and Abreviations 
AV – Anti-Virus 
CFH – Cown Fibre Holdings 
DoS - Denial of Service 
DSD – Defense Signals Directorate 
FTC – Federal Trade Council 
GCSB – Government Communications Security Bureau 
ICS-CERT – Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team 
ICT – Information and Communications Technology 
IDS – Intrusion Detection Systems 
IPS – Intrusion Detection & Prevention Systems 
ISP – Internet Service Provider 
IFT – Informal Formal Technical 
IT – Information Technology 
NBR – National Business Review 
NCSC – National Cyber Security Centre 
NZCSS – New Zealand Cyber Security Strategy 
NZDIA – New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs 
NZISM – New Zealand Information Security Manual 
NZMED - New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development 
NZSIT – New Zealand Security of Information Technology 
PCI DSS – Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard 
PCI SSC – Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council 
TAM – Technology Acceptance Model  
TJX – TJX Companies Incorporated 
 
